University of Pittsburgh School of Law

Scholarship@PITT LAW
Amici Briefs

Faculty Publications

2012

Brief of Amici Curiae Thirteenth Amendment Scholars in Support
of Plaintiff-Appellee and Affirmance
William M. Carter Jr.
University of Pittsburgh School of Law, william.carter@law.pitt.edu

Dawinder S. Sidhu
University of Maryland at Shady Grove

Alexander Tsesis
Loyola University Chicago School of Law

Rebecca E. Zietlow
University of Toledo College of Law

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.pitt.edu/fac_amici_briefs
Part of the Civil Rights and Discrimination Commons, Constitutional Law Commons, Gender and
Sexuality Commons, Inequality and Stratification Commons, Law and Gender Commons, Law and
Philosophy Commons, Law and Race Commons, Law and Society Commons, Race and Ethnicity
Commons, Sexuality and the Law Commons, and the Social and Cultural Anthropology Commons

Recommended Citation
William M. Carter Jr., Dawinder S. Sidhu, Alexander Tsesis & Rebecca E. Zietlow, Brief of Amici Curiae
Thirteenth Amendment Scholars in Support of Plaintiff-Appellee and Affirmance, U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Tenth Circuit, No. 12-2040 (2012).
Available at: https://scholarship.law.pitt.edu/fac_amici_briefs/1

This Amici Brief is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Publications at Scholarship@PITT LAW.
It has been accepted for inclusion in Amici Briefs by an authorized administrator of Scholarship@PITT LAW. For
more information, please contact leers@pitt.edu, shephard@pitt.edu.

No. 12-2040
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT
_____________
UNITED STATES,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
WILLIAM HATCH,
Defendant-Appellant.
_____________
ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW MEXICO

BRIEF OF AMICI CURIAE THIRTEENTH AMENDMENT SCHOLARS
IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE AND AFFIRMANCE

GEORGE BACH
Counsel of Record
DAWINDER S. SIDHU
1117 Stanford NE, MSC11 6070
1 University of New Mexico
Albuquerque, NM 87131
(505) 277-2146

August 1, 2012

WILLIAM M. CARTER, JR.
3900 Forbes Avenue
Pittsburgh, PA 15260
(412) 648-1401
ALEXANDER TSESIS
25 E. Pearson Street
Chicago, IL 60611
(312) 915-7929
REBECCA E. ZIETLOW
2801 West Bancroft, MS 507
Toledo, OH
(419) 530-2872

TABLE OF CONTENTS
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES………………………………………………... ii
INTERESTS OF AMICI CURIAE…………………………………………... 1
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT……………………………………………... 3
ARGUMENT: DISTRICT COURT PROPERLY DENIED
APPELLANT’S MOTION TO DISMISS THE INDICTMENT FOR
VIOLATIONS OF 18 U.S.C. § 249(a)(1)…………………………………… 6
I.

The Historical Record and Supreme Court Caselaw Make Clear
that Congress Enjoys Broad Authority to Enforce the Thirteenth
Amendment…………………………………………………………… 6

II.

Section 249(a)(1) is Governed by the “Rationality” Standard of
Jones…………………………………………………………………... 10
A. The Constitutionality of 18 U.S.C. § 249(a)(1) Must be
Reviewed Under Jones…………………………………………... 10
B.

The District Court Correctly Held that City of Boerne Does
Not Apply to 18 U.S.C. § 249(a)(1)……………………………... 12

III. Congress Validly Enacted 18 U.S.C. § 249(a)(1) Pursuant to the
Thirteenth Amendment……………………………………………….. 18
A. 18 U.S.C. § 249(a)(1) Easily Satisfies Jones……………………. 18
B.

As 18 U.S.C. § 249(a)(1) Was Passed Pursuant to an
Enumerated Constitutional Power, It Does Not Offend
Federalism Principles………………………………………......... 21

IV. As the Thirteenth Amendment Applies to all Badges and Incidents
of Slavery Inflicted Upon Any Person of Any Race, 18 U.S.C.
§ 249(a)(1) Does Not Implicate Strict Scrutiny or Violate Equal
Protection Principles………………………………………………….. 23
CONCLUSION……………………………………………………………… 30

i

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Cases
CBOCS West, Inc. v. Humphries, 553 U.S. 442 (2008)…………………………..16
Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883)……………………………………… passim
City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997)………………………………passim
Domino’s Pizza, Inc. v. McDonald, 546 U.S. 470 (2006)……………………….18
Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1968)…………………………passim
Jones v. R.R. Donnelley & Sons Co., 541 U.S. 369 (2004)………………………18
McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819)………………..11, 19, 21
McDonald v. Sante Fe Trail Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273 (1976)…………………28
Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164 (1989)……………………….18
Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896)………………………………………..19
Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160 (1976)…………………………………….7, 17
Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873)……………………………7
United States v. Beebe, et al., 807 F.Supp.2d 1045 (D. N.M. 2011)……3, 4, 13, 27
United States v. Bob Lawrence Realty, Inc., 474 F.2d 115 (5th Cir. 1973), cert.
denied, 414 U.S. 826 (1973)………………………………………………………11
United States v. Comstock, 560 U.S. ____, 130 S.Ct. 1949 (2010)………………22
United States v. Hampshire, 95 F.3d 999 (10th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 519 U.S.
1084 (1997)……………………………………………………………………….22
United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995)……………………………………..22
ii

United States v. Nelson, 277 F.3d 164 (2nd Cir. 2002)……………………….10, 15
Constitutional and Statutory Provisions
18 U.S.C. § 249(a)(1)………………………………………………………...passim
1867 Anti-Peonage Act, Ch. 187, 14 Stat. 546 (1867) (codified as amended at 18
U.S.C. §1581 (2006) and 42 U.S.C. §1994 (2006))………………………………29
An Act to Protect Persons of Foreign Birth Against Forcible Constraint or
Involuntary Servitude, ch. 464, 18 Stat. 251 (1874) (codified as amended at 18
U.S.C.§ 1584 (2006)………………………………………………………………29
Civil Rights Act of 1866, ch. 31, 14 Stat. 27 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §
242 and 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 1982)……………………………………………...9, 17
U.S. CONST. Art. I. § 8, cl. 3……………………………………………………….4
U.S. CONST. amend. XIII §1………………………………………………….passim
U.S. CONST. amend. XIII § 2…………………………………………………passim
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV……………………………………………………..passim

Legislative Materials
CONG. GLOBE, 36TH CONG., 1ST SESS. (1860)…………………………………….28
CONG. GLOBE, 38TH CONG., 1ST SESS. (1864)…………………………………….25
CONG. GLOBE, 38TH CONG., 2ND SESS. (1865)………………………………..24, 28
CONG. GLOBE, 39TH CONG., 1ST SESS. (1865-66)………………………………8, 11
CONG. GLOBE, 42ND CONG., 1ST SESS. (1871)…………………………………….11
CONG. GLOBE, 42ND CONG., 2ND SESS. (1872)……………………………………25

iii

Other Authorities
Akhil Reed Amar, Plessy v. Ferguson and the Anti-Canon, 39 PEPP. L. REV. 75
(2011)……………………………………………………………………………...19
G. Sidney Buchanan, The Quest for Freedom: A Legal History of the Thirteenth
Amendment, 12 HOUS. L. REV. 1069 (1975)………………………………………..9
William M. Carter, Jr., A Thirteenth Amendment Framework for Combating Racial
Profiling, 39 HARV. CIVIL RIGHTS-CIVIL LIBERTIES L. REV. 17 (2004)………23, 26
William M. Carter, Jr., Race, Rights, and the Thirteenth Amendment: Defining the
Badges and Incidents of Slavery, 40 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1311 (2007)…………...26
William M. Carter, Jr., The Thirteenth Amendment, Interest Convergence, and the
Badges and Incidents of Slavery, 71 MD. L. REV. 21 (2012)……………………..23
Michael Kent Curtis, The Klan, the Congress, and the Court, 11 U. PA. J. CONST.
L. 1381 (2009)…………………………………………………………………….27
James A. Garfield, Oration Delivered at Ravenna, Ohio July 4, 1865, in 1 THE
WORKS OF JAMES ABRAM GARFIELD 86 (Burke A. Hinsdale ed., 1882)………...7, 8
R.A. Lenhardt, Understanding the Mark: Race, Stigma, and Equality in Context,
79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 803 (2004)…………………………………………………….19
Darrell A. H. Miller, White Cartels, the Civil Rights Act of 1866 and the History of
Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 999 (2008)…………….26, 29
John E. Nowak, The Rise and Fall of Supreme Court Concern for Racial
Minorities, 36 WM. & MARY L. REV. 345 (1995)…………………………………17
George Rutherglen, State Action, Private Action, and the Thirteenth Amendment,
94 VA. L. REV. 1367 (2008)………………………………………………………..7
Dawinder S. Sidhu, A Constitutional Remedy for Urban Poverty, 62 DEPAUL L.
REV. * (forthcoming, 2012), available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1872184........10
Alexander Tsesis, The Problem of Confederate Symbols: A Thirteenth Amendment
Approach, 75 TEMP. L. REV. 539 (2002) …………………………………………20
iv

Alexander Tsesis, Gender Discrimination and the Thirteenth Amendment, 112
COLUM. L. REV. * (forthcoming 2012)…………………………………………….8
Rebecca E. Zietlow, Free At Last! Anti-Subordination and the Thirteenth
Amendment, 90 B.U. L. REV. 255 (2010)…………………………………………29

v

INTERESTS OF AMICI CURIAE 1
Amici are professors of law whose expertise focuses primarily or at least
substantially on the Thirteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. Amici are
united in their belief that the Thirteenth Amendment should be construed so as to
give full meaning and practical effect to its protections, and that the Thirteenth
Amendment remains a vital instrument of liberty and an essential shield against
targeted racial violence in contemporary America.
Amici, prominent scholars in this area of constitutional law, have published a
number of academic works -- in law review, essay, and book format -- on the
meaning, scope, and modern applicability of the Thirteenth Amendment. Amici
therefore have significant professional and intellectual interest in ensuring that the
Court properly interprets the Thirteenth Amendment. Moreover, two law review
articles, written by one of the amici law professors, have been cited and
mischaracterized by Appellant. Amici therefore possess additional professional
and scholarly interest in correcting Appellant’s representation of those articles and
thereby ensuring that the Court properly understands the arguments contained in
them.
1

Pursuant to Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 29(c)(5), counsel for
amici declare that no counsel for either party authored this brief in whole or in part;
no party or no party’s counsel contributed money that was intended to fund
preparing or submitting the brief; and that no person -- other than the amici, its
members, or its counsel -- contributed money that was intended to fund preparing
or submitting the brief.
1

Amici submit this brief for these purposes, and to illuminate matters within
their expertise and to enrich the Court’s understanding of the Thirteenth
Amendment.
Amici names and their institutional affiliations, which are listed for
identification reasons only, are as follows:
 William M. Carter, Jr., Dean, University of Pittsburgh School of Law
 Dawinder S. Sidhu, Assistant Professor of Law, University of New Mexico
School of Law
 Alexander Tsesis, Associate Professor of Law, Loyola University, Chicago,
School of Law
 Rebecca E. Zietlow, Charles W. Fornoff Professor of Law and Values,
University of Toledo College of Law

2

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
This case owes its existence to troubling facts, and this appeal to Appellant’s
mistaken understanding of the Thirteenth Amendment. With respect to the facts,
Appellant and two other white men, Paul Beebe and Jesse Sanford, assaulted a
developmentally disabled Native American man, and subjected the victim to this
violent mistreatment specifically because he is not white. For this, Appellant,
Beebe, and Sanford were indicted for violating the Hate Crimes Prevention Act, 18
U.S.C. § 249(a)(1), which makes it a crime to “willfully cause[] bodily injury to
any person or,” through the use of certain instruments, “attempt[] to cause bodily
injury to any person, because of the actual or perceived race, color, religion, or
national origin of any person[.]” As the parties agree, Section 249(a)(1) was
passed by Congress pursuant to its enforcement power under Section Two of the
Thirteenth Amendment, U.S. CONST. amend. XIII § 2. See Appellant’s Br. at 8
(“The legislative history of the [Act] reflects Congress’s understanding that it was
acting under the Thirteenth Amendment in enacting § 249(a)(1)[.]”); Defs.’ Mot. to
Dismiss, United States v. Beebe, et al., No. 1:10-CR-03104-BB, at 2 (D. N.M. May
20, 2011) (“The [Act] findings cite the Thirteenth Amendment as authority for the
provisions in § 249(a)(1)[.]”); U.S. Resp. Br., United States v. Beebe, et al., No.
1:10-CR-03104-BB, at 5 (D. N.M. June 20, 2011) (“As acknowledged by the
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defendants, [§ 249(a)(1)] was enacted pursuant to Congress’s Thirteenth
Amendment authority to eradicate badges and incidents of slavery.”). 2
Defendants moved to dismiss the indictments on the theory that Section
249(a)(1) exceeds Congress’s Thirteenth Amendment enforcement power and is
inconsistent with the Equal Protection guarantee of the Fifth Amendment. The
U.S. District Court for the District of New Mexico denied the motion, holding that
“the Thirteenth Amendment, Section Two, provided Congress with ample
authority to pass section 249(a)(1).” United States v. Beebe, et al., 807 F.Supp.2d
1045, 1047 (D. N.M. 2011); see also id. at 1053 (“The facts involved in this case
are not near any grey area of section 249’s constitutionality, but rather fall well
within the scope of actions that the framers empowered Congress to ban in passing
Section Two of the Thirteenth Amendment.”). It further concluded that as “the
statute applies to crimes against victims of all races… victimized on the basis of
race,” “the statute addresses this race-related issue in a racially neutral manner”
and therefore “raises no equal protection issue.” Id. at 1058.
With respect to this appeal, Appellant renews his constitutional objections.
Appellant contends in particular that Section 249(a)(1) encroaches on States’ rights
2

The Act contains an additional criminal offense, 18 U.S.C. § 249(a)(2),
which Congress passed pursuant to its Commerce Clause power, see U.S. CONST.,
Art. I. § 8, cl. 3. As there is no dispute that Appellant was indicted for violating
Section 249(a)(1) and not Section 249(a)(2), and as neither of the questions
presented by Appellant address the Commerce Clause, amici will focus only on
Congress’s authority under the Thirteenth Amendment to pass Section 249(a)(1).
4

and is unnecessary due to States’ prosecution of bias-motivated crimes, and that
therefore this statutory provision cannot stand as valid Thirteenth Amendment
legislation under either the City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997) standard
that Appellant prefers, or the Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1968)
standard that the District Court, United States, and amici agree applies. Appellant
additionally claims that the Thirteenth Amendment does not authorize Congress to
protect white victims, and that therefore Section 249(a)(1) validly extends to only
certain races, embodies a racial classification as a result, and does not survive the
requisite strict scrutiny equal protection standard.
Amici, leading scholars on the Thirteenth Amendment, believe that Section
249(a)(1) falls well within Congress’s Thirteenth Amendment enforcement power
and is plainly constitutional. In this brief, amici seek to describe the broad scope
of Congress’s Thirteenth Amendment enforcement power; argue that Thirteenth
Amendment legislation must be reviewed under the deferential “rationality”
standard of Jones; explain that because Section 249(a)(1) is grounded in a specific
enumerated power, it neither infringes on States’ sovereignty nor does it stem from
or give rise to any “federal police power”; and clarify that, because the Thirteenth
Amendment empowers Congress to eradicate the badges and incidents of slavery
as to any racial group, including whites, it does not contain a racial classification
and thereby does not trigger strict scrutiny or any Equal Protection concerns.
5

As the District Court’s order is consistent with these principles, and as
Appellant’s challenges to the order are not supported by a proper interpretation of
the Thirteenth Amendment, amici urge the Court to affirm the decision below.
ARGUMENT
DISTRICT COURT PROPERLY DENIED APPELLANT’S
MOTION TO DISMISS THE INDICTMENT FOR VIOLATIONS OF 18
U.S.C. § 249(a)(1)
I.

THE HISTORICAL RECORD AND SUPREME COURT CASELAW
MAKE CLEAR THAT CONGRESS ENJOYS BROAD AUTHORITY
TO ENFORCE THE THIRTEENTH AMENDMENT
The Thirteenth Amendment declares that “Neither slavery nor involuntary

servitude, except as a punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been duly
convicted, shall exist within the United States, or any place subject to their
jurisdiction.” U.S. CONST. amend. XIII §1. “The amendment is not a mere
prohibition of State laws establishing or upholding slavery, but an absolute
declaration that slavery or involuntary servitude shall not exist in any part of the
United States.” Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 20 (1883). The Thirteenth
Amendment further empowers Congress “to enforce this article by appropriate
legislation.” U.S. CONST. amend. XIII § 2. Historical sources and Supreme Court
pronouncements indicate that Section Two of the Amendment gives Congress
broad authority to enforce the substantive, robust command of Section One.

6

As a reflection of its expansive scope, Congress may, pursuant to the
Thirteenth Amendment, regulate private conduct and not just state action. Jones,
392 U.S. at 443-44 (1968) (holding that the Thirteenth Amendment allows
Congress to prevent private acts of discrimination); Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S.
160, 172-73 (1976) (same). Accordingly, “[t]he Thirteenth Amendment stands out
in the Constitution as the only provision currently in effect that directly regulates
private action.” See George Rutherglen, State Action, Private Action, and the
Thirteenth Amendment, 94 VA. L. REV. 1367, 1370 (2008). Moreover, Thirteenth
Amendment protections are not only absolute, but also universal. The Thirteenth
Amendment’s prohibitions extend to all races, not just African-Americans. See
Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 72 (1873).
Those prohibitions themselves are broad. While Section One of the
Amendment speaks in terms of slavery and involuntary servitude, from the days of
ratification there was a consensus that the Amendment is about much more. In the
words of the Congressman and future President of the United States, James A.
Garfield, liberty is no more than “a bitter mockery” and “a cruel delusion” if it is
merely the freeing of slaves from the bondage without the federal protection
against private militias, such as the Ku Klux Klan. James A. Garfield, Oration
Delivered at Ravenna, Ohio July 4, 1865, in 1 THE WORKS OF JAMES ABRAM
GARFIELD 86 (Burke A. Hinsdale ed., 1882). Indeed, during the congressional
7

debates on the Thirteenth Amendment, those congressmen who supported its
passage onto the States for ratification repeatedly spoke about how modification to
the Constitution would allow for congressionally led civil rights reform.
Representative Isaac N. Arnold, who was President Lincoln’s close confidant,
asserted that the Thirteenth Amendment would establish “equality before the law .
. . to be the great cornerstone” of the United States government. In a similar vein,
Senator John Sherman of Ohio, who had his hand on the pulse of federal power
later becoming Secretary of the Treasury and then Secretary of State, asserted that
the enforcement provision was “an express grant of power to Congress to secure . .
. liberty by appropriate legislation.” CONG. GLOBE, 39TH CONG., 1ST SESS. 41
(1865).
Passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1866 only a year after ratification of the
Thirteenth Amendment provides one of the best indicators of the Thirteenth
Amendment augmented federal authority to pass civil rights laws. The
overwhelming majority of Congressmen who passed the Amendment on to the
states for ratification also voted for the Act of 1866. See Alexander Tsesis, Gender
Discrimination and the Thirteenth Amendment, 112 COLUM. L. REV. *
(forthcoming 2012) (providing a complete comparison of congressional voting
records on the Thirteenth Amendment and Civil Rights Act of 1866). The
protections of contractual, ownership, and litigation rights in the Civil Rights Act
8

of 1866 were only the beginnings of Congress’s uses of Thirteenth Amendment
authority. Civil Rights Act of 1866, ch. 31, 14 Stat. 27 (codified as amended at 18
U.S.C. § 242 and 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 1982).
The Supreme Court’s Thirteenth Amendment jurisprudence similarly
recognizes the broad meaning of the Amendment’s prohibitions and Congress’s
attendant significant authority to enforce the Amendment. The Amendment not
only “nullif[ied]” slavery, the Court held, but also “clothed Congress with power to
pass all laws necessary and proper for abolishing all badges and incidents of
slavery in the United States[.]” Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. at 20. The Court
clarified in Jones that Congress has the authority “rationally to determine what are
the badges and the incidents of slavery, and the authority to translate that
determination into effective legislation.” Jones, 392 U.S. at 440; see also G.
Sidney Buchanan, The Quest for Freedom: A Legal History of the Thirteenth
Amendment, 12 HOUS. L. REV. 1069, 1071 (1975) (“Congress, in defining badges
of slavery, can expand the self-executing force of the thirteenth amendment, that is,
Congress can define given conduct as constituting a badge of slavery even though
such conduct would not be prohibited by the thirteenth amendment, unaided by
congressional legislation.”). Accordingly, as Judge Guido Calabresi has
explained, “Congress’s enforcement power under Section Two of the Thirteenth

9

Amendment extends well beyond the scope of the direct prohibitions contained in
Section One.” United States v. Nelson, 277 F.3d 164, 185 n. 20 (2nd Cir. 2002).
Based on the above, it is beyond doubt that Congress’s enforcement power
under the Thirteenth Amendment is quite significant. 3
II.

SECTION 249(A)(1) IS GOVERNED BY THE “RATIONALITY”
STANDARD OF JONES
A. THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF 18 U.S.C. § 249(a)(1) MUST BE
REVIEWED UNDER JONES
Congress relied on its robust Thirteenth Amendment power to enact 18

U.S.C. § 249(a)(1). Challenges to laws passed pursuant to the Thirteenth
Amendment are reviewed under the standard set forth by the Supreme Court in
Jones. Accordingly, the Court must turn to Jones in order to assess the
constitutionality of § 249(a)(1).
In Jones, the Supreme Court limited its review to whether a statute passed
pursuant to the Thirteenth Amendment is rationally related to a necessary and
proper method for ending existing incidents and badges of slavery and involuntary
servitude. Jones, 392 U.S. at 439 (quoting Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. at 20
(holding that the Section Two of the Thirteenth Amendment empowers Congress
3

For a discussion of other aspects of the meaning of the Thirteenth
Amendment, including the absence of any intent requirement and the view that the
Amendment entitles all individuals, not just African-Americans, to a minimal
threshold of liberty, see Dawinder S. Sidhu, A Constitutional Remedy for Urban
Poverty, 62 DEPAUL L. REV. * (forthcoming, 2012), available at:
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1872184, *43-48.
10

‘to pass all laws necessary and proper for abolishing all badges and incidents of
slavery in the United States.”)). The Court stated that, “Surely Congress has the
power under the Thirteenth Amendment rationally to determine what are the
badges and the incidents of slavery, and the authority to translate that
determination into effective legislation.” 392 U.S. at 440.
This formulation is deferential. Members of the Reconstruction Congress
repeatedly invoked the deferential test for congressional power provided in
McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819), to illustrate the meaning
of the word “appropriate” in Section Two. See, e.g., CONG. GLOBE, 39TH CONG.,
1ST SESS. 1115, 1118 (1866) (statement of Rep. Wilson); CONG. GLOBE, 42ND
CONG., 1ST SESS. 686, 695 (1871) (statement of Sen. Thurman). As Senator
Lyman Trumbull explained, “what the ‘appropriate legislation’ is, is for Congress
to determine, and nobody else.” CONG. GLOBE, 39TH CONG., 1ST SESS. 39, 43
(1865).
Jones is consistent with this original understanding that Section Two
empowers Congress with substantial autonomy to enforce the amendment, and
invokes a standard of judicial deference. See United States v. Bob Lawrence
Realty, Inc., 474 F.2d 115, 120 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 826 (1973)
(“the mandate of Jones is clear. This Court will give great deference, as indeed it
must, to the congressional determination that [the statutory provision under review]
11

will effectuate the purpose of the Thirteenth Amendment by aiding in the
elimination of the ‘badges and incidents of slavery in the United States.’”) (quoting
Jones, 392 U.S. at 439).
It has long been a canonical doctrine that Congress’s authority under the
Thirteenth Amendment is similar to the legislative power under the Necessary and
Proper Clause. The Court in Jones recognized that under the Thirteenth
Amendment Congress could pass any laws “necessary and proper” for ending any
remaining badges of slavery. Jones, 392 U.S. at 439. That conclusion was
predicated on precedent that is now over one hundred years old, holding that
Congress has the “power to pass all laws necessary and proper for abolishing all
badges and incidents of slavery in the United States.” Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S.
at 20.
B. THE DISTRICT COURT CORRECTLY HELD THAT CITY OF
BOERNE DOES NOT APPLY TO 18 U.S.C. § 249(a)(1)
Appellant urges this Court to reject the rational basis approach of Jones, and
adopt the Fourteenth Amendment congruence and proportionality test of City of
Boerne. However, Appellant’s formulation misconstrues City of Boerne. The
Supreme Court has never extended nor suggested that the congruence and
proportionality test of City of Boerne applies to evaluations of Congress’s exercise
of its Thirteenth Amendment enforcement power. The City of Boerne holding is
inapplicable to any other constitutional grant of legislative authority other than the
12

Fourteenth Amendment. The concerns underlying City of Boerne’s Fourteenth
Amendment holding are not present with respect to Thirteenth Amendment
legislation, and the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments are analytically
distinct. Indeed, the Supreme Court in a post-City of Boerne ruling invoked the
Jones test. Finally, grafting the City of Boerne standard on the Thirteenth
Amendment would undermine other civil rights legislation.
In the 1997 case of City of Boerne, the Court imposed restrictions on
congressional power to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment, pursuant to Section
Five of that Amendment. City of Boerne, 521 U.S. 507. The Court held that the
Section Five power was limited to legislation that is congruent and proportional to
a violation of Section One of that Amendment. Id. at 519-20. As the District
Court below noted, City of Boerne only considered the Fourteenth Amendment
enforcement power, and gave no indication that its congruence and proportionality
test would apply to any of the enforcement clauses in any other amendments.
Beebe, 807 F. Supp.2d at 1049.
In City of Boerne, the Court struck down a provision of the Religious
Freedom Restoration Act, which regulated state governments, because it was not
congruent and proportional to the state’s violation of the Free Exercise clause of
the First Amendment. City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 532. In its ruling, the Court
stated that if Congress’s power to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment is too broad,
13

it would threaten state autonomy and principles of separation of powers. Id.
Neither concern justifies applying the same restrictive test to the Section Two
power to enforce the Thirteenth Amendment.
Congressional enforcement of the Thirteenth Amendment simply does not
have the same implications to state autonomy as enforcement of the Fourteenth
Amendment. The scope of the Section Five power directly affects the state
because Congress can only use that power to regulate state action. See Civil Rights
Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883). By contrast, much of the legislation enforcing the
Thirteenth Amendment, including that at issue in this case, regulates private, and
not state, action. Thus, unlike legislation enforcing the Fourteenth Amendment,
Section Two based legislation does not have any more impact on state autonomy
than any other federal legislation.
Similarly, the City of Boerne Court’s concern about separation of powers
does not justify restricting the Section Two power. In City of Boerne, the Court
was confronted with a statute in which Congress had attempted to define the
Fourteenth Amendment differently from the way that the Court had defined it,
intruding on the proper function of “the Judicial Branch . . . to say what the law is.”
City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 536. By contrast, the Court has never reached a
definitive holding regarding the meaning of the Thirteenth Amendment’s
prescription of the badges and incidents of slavery. Indeed, the meaning of the
14

direct prohibitions of Section One of the Amendment “has almost never been
addressed directly by the courts, in the absence of specific congressional
legislation enacted.” Nelson, 277 F.3d at 185 n. 20. Therefore, legislation defining
the badges or incidents of slavery cannot be said to conflict with any prior
determination of that meaning by the Court. Thus, concerns of separation of
powers also do not justify extending the congruence and proportionality test to
Congress’ Section Two power.
Moreover, though the Thirteenth Amendment and Fourteenth Amendments
have their origins in post-Civil War attempts to restore meaningful liberty to all
Americans, particularly African-Americans, the two are distinct. The Thirteenth
Amendment, unlike the Fourteenth, contains a positive mandate (i.e., that slavery
shall no longer exist in the United States). The Supreme Court has found that the
Thirteenth Amendment’s Section Two is, unlike the Fourteenth Amendment’s
Section Five, broad and entitled to significant deference. The Thirteenth
Amendment, unlike the Fourteenth, has no state action requirement and thus
Congress has Thirteenth Amendment authority to pass legislation directly affecting
private conduct. Accordingly, to superimpose Fourteenth Amendment
jurisprudence unto the Thirteenth Amendment presumes away the analytical
distinction between the Fourteenth and Thirteenth Amendments that the Court has
always taken to be a given. If the Court were to follow Appellant’s suggestion to
15

graft the congruence and proportionality test from the Fourteenth Amendment onto
the Thirteenth Amendment area, it would be deviating from over a hundred years
of precedents. The Court’s unwavering analytical contrast between the Thirteenth
and Fourteenth Amendments’ Enforcement Clauses means that the congruence and
proportionality test does not apply to 18 U.S.C. § 249(a)(1), whose passage was
predicated on Thirteenth Amendment powers, but not the Fourteenth Amendment.
Even after City of Boerne, the Court has adhered to its ruling in Jones and
continued to defer to the Section Two power. In the 2008 case of CBOCS West,
Inc. v. Humphries, the Court held that 42 U.S.C. §1981, a provision of the 1866
Civil Rights Act which prohibits race discrimination in contracts, encompasses a
complaint of retaliation against a person who has complained about race
discrimination against another employer. 553 U.S. 442, 446 (2008). The Court
broadly interpreted the meaning of §1981, relying on stare decisis and
congressional deference. Id. at 449-52. The Court’s ruling in CBOCS indicates
that it did not believe that the City of Boerne standard extended to the Section Two
power.
Finally, Appellant’s proposed test for reviewing 18 U.S.C. § 249(a)(1)
would have negative repercussions as to §1981 and civil rights law more generally.
If the congruence and proportionality test were to be applied to the interpretation of
statutes passed pursuant to Thirteenth Amendment enforcement authority, it might
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signal the demise of 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 and 1982. 42 U.S.C. §1981 (2006)
(originally enacted as Civil Rights Act of 1866, ch. 31, 14 Stat. 27, 27) (“All
persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall have the same right in
every State and Territory to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, give
evidence, and to the full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the
security of persons and property as is enjoyed by white citizens, and shall be
subject to like punishment, pains, penalties, taxes, licenses, and exactions of every
kind, and to no other.”); 42 U.S.C. §1982 (originally enacted as part of the Civil
Rights Act of 1866, ch. 31, 14 Stat. 27, 27) (“All citizens of the United States shall
have the same right, in every State and Territory, as is enjoyed by white citizens
thereof to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold, and convey real and personal
property.”); John E. Nowak, The Rise and Fall of Supreme Court Concern for
Racial Minorities, 36 WM. & MARY L. REV. 345, 388 (1995) (mentioning that
Congress passed §§1981 and 1982 based on its Thirteenth Amendment grant of
authority).
The Supreme Court has long held that §§ 1981 and 1982 are rationally
related to Congress’s Thirteenth Amendment authority without ever reviewing
their congruence nor proportionality to the discriminatory harms they address.
Jones, 392 U.S. at 440-41; Runyon, 427 U.S. at 170 (adopting the Jones test of
whether a “prohibition was within Congress's power under Section 2 of the
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Thirteenth Amendment ‘rationally to determine what are the badges and the
incidents of slavery, and... to translate that determination into effective
legislation”’ (quoting Jones, 392 U.S. at 440)). The Court has repeatedly applied §
1981 in the context of employment discrimination. Patterson v. McLean Credit
Union, 491 U.S. 164, 175-76 (1989), superseded by statute on other grounds Jones
v. R.R. Donnelley & Sons Co., 541 U.S. 369, 372-73 (2004); Domino’s Pizza, Inc.
v. McDonald, 546 U.S. 470, 476 (2006). In reviewing statutes passed pursuant to
the Thirteenth Amendment, the congruence and proportionality test would add a
layer of judicial review that would increase the burden of proof for employment
discrimination plaintiffs beyond anything ever recognized. Therefore, Appellant’s
suggested test could have a negative impact far outside the specific provisions of
18 U.S.C. § 249(a)(1).
For all of these reasons, this Court should continue to adhere to the
deferential standard of Jones and reject Appellant’s attempt to extend City of
Boerne to the Thirteenth Amendment Section Two power.
III.

CONGRESS VALIDLY ENACTED 18 U.S.C. § 249(A)(1) PURSUANT
TO THE THIRTEENTH AMENDMENT

A. 18 U.S.C. § 249(A)(1) EASILY SATISFIES JONES
In Jones, the Supreme Court pointed out that, Congress is empowered to
rationally determine laws that are “necessary and proper” for eradicating the
badges and incidents of slavery. 392 U.S. at 440. The Court has construed
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“necessary and proper” in light of Chief Justice Marshall’s guiding principle in
McCulloch v. Maryland that “necessary and proper” is constitutionally
synonymous, or at least analogous, to “appropriate,” which is the language used in
the Section Two of the Thirteenth Amendment. McCulloch, 17 U.S. at 356. The
facts of this case exemplify the fact that Congress’s determination that 18 U.S.C. §
249(a)(1) is necessary and proper for the purpose of eliminating the badges and
incidents of slavery comfortably surpasses Jones’s modest threshold of rationality.
It is undisputed that the defendants in this action branded the victim, a
developmentally Native American man. Branding is a quintessential badge and
incident of slavery. In his famous dissent in Plessy v. Ferguson, Justice Harlan
equated “badge[s] of servitude” with that which “practically… puts the brand of
servitude and degradation upon a large class of our fellow-citizens, our equals
before the law.” 163 U.S. 537, 562 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting). As a
preeminent constitutional law scholar explains, “When [Justice Harlan] uses the
word ‘brand,’” he is “referring to how human beings under slavery were branded
like cattle.” Akhil Reed Amar, Plessy v. Ferguson and the Anti-Canon, 39 PEPP. L.
REV. 75, 86 (2011). It is beyond question that branding was a regular mechanism
used by overseers to subjugate slaves. See R.A. Lenhardt, Understanding the
Mark: Race, Stigma, and Equality in Context, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 803, 815 (2004)
(“Brands were used as a way of identifying African slaves as human property up
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until the latter part of the eighteenth century and as a method of punishment well
into the nineteenth century,” “were used to demarcate slave or outsider status,” and
undoubtedly and directly carry “racial stigma”). Frederick Douglass, for example,
noted that the skin of a slave was “laid bare… the iron was then delivered red hot
(sensation), and applied to the quivering flesh, imprinting upon it the name of the
monster who claimed the slave.” Amar at 86 n.99 (citation omitted).
The victim in this action was not only branded by his white captors because
he was not-white, but was branded with a swastika -- an undeniable symbol of
white supremacy and of racial hate. The meaning of the swastika brings the
branding of this particular case well within the type of racial domination and
intimidation contemplated by the Thirteenth Amendment. See Alexander Tsesis,
The Problem of Confederate Symbols: A Thirteenth Amendment Approach, 75
TEMP. L. REV. 539, 548 (2002) (identifying swastikas as among the “threatening
signs” that “have historical connotations that draw upon and enhance the ‘badges’
and ‘symbols’ of servitude, discrimination, oppression, and persecution.”).
Appellant’s concern that 18 U.S.C. § 249(a)(1) reaches every conceivable
harm or form of discrimination, or that a decision upholding the constitutionality of
the statutory provision will open the door to unlimited congressional action, is
unfounded. Section 249(a)(1) as applied to this case reaches racial conduct that
was central to slavery and that conveys white dominance and racial hatred.
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Accordingly, there is ample support, particularly in the context of this case, for the
District Court’s holding that it was rational for Congress to enact 18 U.S.C. §
249(a)(1) pursuant to its Thirteenth Amendment enforcement power. 4
B. AS 18 U.S.C. § 249(A)(1) WAS PASSED PURSUANT TO AN
ENUMERATED CONSTITUTIONAL POWER, IT DOES NOT
OFFEND FEDERALISM PRINCIPLES
“[T]he powers of the government are limited, and… its limits are not to be
transcended.” McCulloch, 17 U.S. at 39. In keeping with this fundamental,
foundational proposition, Congress may only act pursuant to an enumerated power.
See id. at 32 (the federal government “can exercise only the powers granted to it”).
Appellant contends that 18 U.S.C. § 249(a)(1) violates States’ sovereignty,
apparently under the theory that hate crimes are the province of State police
powers and are adequately addressed by way of State laws. This argument may be
quickly disposed of.
First, as noted above, in enacting 18 U.S.C. § 249(a)(1), Congress was
acting pursuant to an enumerated power. Its authority for passing this statutory
provision is grounded in the Thirteenth Amendment, does not spring from a

4

Amici find it unnecessary to address Appellant’s claim that 18 U.S.C. §
249(a)(1) unconstitutionally gives unlimited authority to the federal government to
regulate hate crimes, because this argument contains no citation to any legal
authority. See Appellant’s Br. at 30-32. That said, it is ironic that Appellant
challenges the certification requirement as granting unrestrained power to the
government when it seems designed to add a layer of review -- a high-level layer at
that -- to the prosecutorial process.
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“federal police power,” and therefore does not, by definition, encroach on States’
police power. Nor is State sovereignty, as codified in the Tenth Amendment,
implicated because Section 249(a)(1) does not “commandeer” the States. See
United States v. Hampshire, 95 F.3d 999, 1004 (10th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 519
U.S. 1084 (1997).
Second, whatever may be said of States’ prosecution of hate crimes,
Appellant’s inquiry into the necessity of Section 249(a)(1) is a policy judgment
reserved to the elected branches of government and the people. Further,
Appellant’s support for this second-guessing are cases -- United States v. Lopez,
514 U.S. 549 (1995), and United States v. Comstock, 560 U.S. ____, 130 S.Ct.
1949 (2010) -- that speak to other enumerated powers -- the Commerce Clause and
the Necessary and Proper Clause -- and that the Supreme Court has not directly
applied to the Thirteenth Amendment context.
Third, as noted above, the concerns for States that undergirded the City of
Boerne opinion are not present here. See Section II.B., infra.
Consequently, nothing in Section 249(a)(1) can be read, under Supreme
Court precedent, to suggest that the statutory provision infringes on States’ police
powers or States’ sovereignty.
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IV.

AS THE THIRTEENTH AMENDMENT APPLIES TO ALL BADGES
AND INCIDENTS OF SLAVERY INFLICTED UPON ANY PERSON
OF ANY RACE, 18 U.S.C. § 249(A)(1) DOES NOT IMPLICATE
STRICT SCRUTINY OR VIOLATE EQUAL PROTECTION
The Thirteenth Amendment’s Framers undoubtedly intended the

Amendment to end chattel slavery and to eliminate the lingering vestiges of the
institution of slavery. Because African-Americans were the principal racial group
subject to institutionalized chattel slavery, and because African-Americans
therefore most directly suffered the badges and incidents of slavery, it is often
incorrectly assumed that the Congress’s power to prohibit contemporary badges
and incidents of slavery is limited to those conditions affecting African-Americans.
However, “[t]his instinctive reaction that the badges and incidents of slavery
analysis is limited to African-Americans is based upon a misunderstanding.”
William M. Carter, Jr., The Thirteenth Amendment, Interest Convergence, and the
Badges and Incidents of Slavery, 71 MD. L. REV. 21, 36 (2012). Although AfricanAmericans were the direct victims of slavery, the Thirteenth Amendment’s
Framers viewed slavery as inflicting systemic harms extending beyond its
individual victims. Section Two of the Thirteenth Amendment was therefore
intended to grant Congress the power to redress any badges and incidents of
slavery, in whatever form they might be found. Thus, as explained in this Section,
Appellant’s contention that Congress’s power to eliminate the badges and incidents
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of slavery only applies to African-Americans is profoundly mistaken as a matter of
the Thirteenth Amendment’s history, intent, and context.
Appellant argues that “while there may have been instances in which whites
were subjected to involuntary servitude, whites were the primary beneficiaries of
the institution of chattel slavery that the Thirteenth Amendment was intended to
eradicate.” Appellant’s Br. at 50. Therefore, Appellant argues, “Congress’s
Thirteenth Amendment authority to eliminate the badges and incidents of slavery
does not empower it to protect persons not burdened by the badges and incidents of
slavery (i.e., whites) from racially motivated crimes.” Id.
This argument wrongly assumes that the groups or individuals burdened by
the contemporary badges and incidents of slavery must be perfectly coextensive
with the racial group that was subject to historical chattel slavery in order for
Congress to properly exercise its Thirteenth Amendment power. This argument
misconstrues the nature of the badges and incidents of slavery that Congress has
the power to prohibit. The Thirteenth Amendment was intended to “remove[]
every vestige of African slavery from the American Republic.” CONG. GLOBE,
38TH CONG., 2ND SESS. 154, 155 (1865) (statement of Rep. Davis). Senator Charles
Sumner, one of the primary architects of the Thirteenth Amendment, stated that the
Amendment:
abolishes slavery entirely . . . . It abolishes its root and branch. It
abolishes it in the general and the particular. It abolishes it in length
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and breadth and then in every detail. . . . Any other interpretation
belittles the great amendment and allows slavery still to linger among
us in some of its insufferable pretensions.
CONG. GLOBE, 42ND CONG., 2ND SESS. 728 (1872). Senator Henry Wilson
similarly stated that the Amendment was designed to “obliterate the last lingering
vestiges of the slave system; its chattelizing [sic], degrading and bloody codes; its
dark, malignant barbarizing spirit; all it was and is, everything connected with it or
pertaining to it . . . .” CONG. GLOBE, 38TH CONG., 1ST SESS. 1199, 1319, 1321,
1324 (1864).
Legal scholars and historians have long recognized that the “root and
branches” of slavery extended beyond its direct effects on African-Americans.
Professor William Carter, for example, has stated that the original intent of the
Thirteenth Amendment’s Framers supports an interpretation of the Amendment
that tethers the reach of the badges and incidents of slavery power to the historical
facts of slavery, but does not necessarily limited it to African-Americans. He
states that:
[T]he badges and incidents of slavery prohibited by the Thirteenth
Amendment [should] be defined with reference to two primary issues:
(1) the connection between the class to which the plaintiff belongs and
the institution of chattel slavery, and (2) the connection the
complained-of injury has to that institution . . . . Even as to nonAfrican American persons, however, there may be particular injuries
or forms of discrimination so closely tied to the structures supporting
or created by the system of slavery that the plaintiff’s personal link to
that institution becomes less determinative.
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William M. Carter, Jr., Race, Rights, and the Thirteenth Amendment: Defining the
Badges and Incidents of Slavery, 40 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1311, 1366, 1369 (2007). 5
Thus, “[t]he standards for legitimate congressional authority [under the Thirteenth
Amendment] should be conceived of as a sliding scale,” under which both the
victim’s identity and the type of discrimination at issue are taken into account.
Darrell A. H. Miller, White Cartels, the Civil Rights Act of 1866 and the History of
Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 999, 1046 (2008). Even if the
first factor is attenuated in its connection to slavery, the strength of the second
factor may be such that the practice at issue nonetheless can be rationally
5

In support of his contention that that the badges and incidents of slavery
power only protects African-Americans, Appellant quotes an earlier article by
Professor Carter stating that “[w]hites were never enslaved, nor do they suffer
current legal or social disabilities as a result of slavery.” Appellant’s Br. at 50.
Taken in context, it is clear that the cited article does not support Appellant’s
argument for at least two reasons. First, the quoted portion appears in a larger
discussion regarding whether racial profiling can be considered a badge or incident
of slavery: “For example, a young white man claiming racial profiling could not
logically assert that a practice of disproportionately subjecting white men to racebased criminal suspicion is a result of social attitudes tied to slavery. Whites were
never enslaved, nor do they suffer current legal or social disabilities as a result of
slavery.” William M. Carter, Jr., A Thirteenth Amendment Framework for
Combating Racial Profiling, 39 HARV. CIVIL RIGHTS-CIVIL LIBERTIES L. REV. 17,
81 (2004). In context, it is clear that the subject under discussion was whether
whites claiming racial profiling could assert that that particular practice subjected
them to a badge or incident of slavery, not whether the badges and incidents of
slavery power can ever be applied to discrimination against non-blacks. Second, in
an earlier discussion on that same subject, the article makes clear that the question
is more nuanced than whether the individual in question is “white” or “black”:
Rather, the pertinent inquiry is whether the form of discrimination at issue is one
that arises out of the slave system, which does not necessarily require that the
victim be black. See, e.g., id. at 35-36.
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considered a badge or incident of slavery. By way of example: hate crimes against
African-Americans would strongly invoke both factors, since both the victim’s
identity and the form of discrimination were at the very core of American slavery.
But, as the District Court recognized in this case, the ability to inflict violence with
impunity based on a person’s racial identity was so central to slavery and the social
and legal structures supporting it that such violence amounts to a badge or incident
of slavery even if the victim is non-black. See Beebee, 807 F.Supp.2d at 1052-53
(reviewing the historical evidence and stating that, “[i]n light of this history, this
Court could not possibly find irrational Congress’ identification of racially
motivated violence as a badge of slavery. Rather, the history indicates that such a
conclusion is ineluctable.”).
To be sure, the lingering vestiges of slavery will most often be felt by the
descendents of the enslaved, i.e., African-Americans. But in describing the badges
and incidents of slavery to be abolished by the Thirteenth Amendment, its Framers
identified many instances of the effects of slavery reaching beyond AfricanAmericans. It is clear that the Framers believed that “[s]lavery not only
undermined liberty for Americans of African descent, but also undermined liberty
for whites.” Michael Kent Curtis, The Klan, the Congress, and the Court, 11 U. PA.
J. CONST. L. 1381, 1385 (2009). For example, in discussing some of the incidents
of the slave system during the congressional debates leading to the Thirteenth
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Amendment, Representative James Ashley stated that “[s]lavery has for many
years defied the government and trampled upon the National Constitution, by
kidnapping, mobbing, and murdering white citizens of the United States guilty of
no offense except protesting against its terrible crimes.” CONG. GLOBE, 38TH
CONG., 2ND SESS. 138, 139 (1865). Similarly, Senator James Harlan noted that
“[one] incident of [slavery] is the suppression of the freedom of speech and of the
press, not only among those down-trodden people themselves but among the white
race. Slavery cannot exist when its merits can be freely discussed. . . .” CONG.
GLOBE, 38TH CONG., 1ST SESS. 1439 (1864). See also CONG. GLOBE, 36TH CONG.,
1ST SESS. 1860-61 (1860) (statement of Representative John Bingham, accusing
Virginia of having “ostracized the [white] friends of emancipation” through
violence and intimidation because slaveholders in the South understood that “if
free speech is tolerated and free labor protected by law, free labor might attain in
their midst to such dignity and importance as would bring into disrepute the system
of slave labor . . . .”). It is therefore clear that as a general proposition, Congress’s
power under the Thirteenth Amendment extends to any badge or incident of
slavery as rationally defined by Congress and that such badges or incidents can
extend to whites. See McDonald v. Sante Fe Trail Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273, 29596 (1976) (“Unlikely as it might have appeared in 1866 that white citizens would
encounter substantial racial discrimination of the sort proscribed under the [Civil
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Rights Act of 1866], . . . Congress was intent upon establishing in the federal law a
broader principle than would have been necessary simply to meet the particular
and immediate plight of the newly freed Negro slaves.”). 6
Moreover, Appellant’s argument is also flawed on the facts of this particular
case. This victim in this case is a Native American man who has a developmental
disability. Whether or not the Thirteenth Amendment’s protections extend to
“whites” in general, the victim of the hate crime in this case was (1) a member of a
racial minority group who (2) has an identifiable disability. “Congressional
legislation that targets acts or disabilities that resemble historic incidents of slavery
and which are applied to discrete, insular, and identifiable minorities with a history
of compelled service in America are [presumptively constitutional under the
Thirteenth Amendment].” Miller, White Cartels, at 1046. If Congress’s Thirteenth
Amendment power does not extend to the power to punish those who inflict

6

It is also worth noting that the Reconstruction Congresses enacted statutes
that were designed to eliminate certain oppressive practices as to all persons, not
only racial minorities or African-Americans in particular. See 1867 Anti-Peonage
Act, Ch. 187, 14 Stat. 546 (1867) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §1581 (2006)
and 42 U.S.C. §1994 (2006)) (prohibiting employment practices that subordinated
workers, including, but not limited to American Indians); An Act to Protect
Persons of Foreign Birth Against Forcible Constraint or Involuntary Servitude, ch.
464, 18 Stat. 251 (1874) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C.§ 1584 (2006))
(prohibiting the practice of bringing children from Italy in large cities, isolating
them, and exploiting their labor). For a discussion of these statutes and the fact
that they extended protections well beyond African-Americans, see Rebecca E.
Zietlow, Free At Last! Anti-Subordination and the Thirteenth Amendment, 90 B.U.
L. REV. 255, 290-94 (2010).
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identity-based violence upon a person -- including literally branding the victim’s
body with white supremacist symbols -- because of his identifiable membership in
two minority groups with a history of subordination and forced labor, it
encompasses very little indeed.
As 18 U.S.C. § 249(a)(1) covers all racial groups, it does not, as Appellant
asserts, embody a racial classification and thus does not implicate the strict
scrutiny standard of the Equal Protection component of the Fifth Amendment.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, amici respectfully submit that the district court’s
order should be affirmed.
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